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Abstract
This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality
rule, Approval voting and the Copeland and Borda rules, with voters
voting sincerly or strategically. Diﬀerent ways of generating random
preference profiles are introduced: Rousseauist cultures are suitable for
common interest project assessment; Impartial cultures are standard
in Social Choice Theory; Distributive cultures and Spatial Euclidean
ones are standard in Political Science.
1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to computation-based simulations of voting. To per-
form such a simulation requires two things. On one hand, one has to specify
the economic environment, that is the number of voters, the number of al-
ternatives, and the voter preferences (or tastes, values, utilities, opinions...)
over the alternatives. On the other hand, one has to specify the decision
process, that is the voting rule and how a voter decides to place in the urn
one ballot rather than another, given her preferences and any other relevant
information.
The random generation of a profile of voter preferences is usually called
a culture. For instance choosing n individual preferences uniformly and
independently among the K! linear orderings of K alternatives is called the
impartial culture of size (n,K). Several diﬀerent cultures will be studied in
this chapter. Diﬀerent cultures may be relevant to model diﬀerent real-life
voting situations: juries, project assesment, commeetee decisons, political
elections,.... The individuals will often be called “voters” and will receive
female pronouns, and I shalll sometime refer to alternatives as “candidates”
and use male pronoums in that case.
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The second ingredient is the voting scheme: voter behavior under a
voting rule. For instance, under the familiar Plurality rule, a voter can vote
for her preferred candidate, not taking into account what she knows about
the relative chances of winning of the various candidates. This behavior
called sincere voting is well defined under Plurality rule (up to indiferences).
Diﬀerent voting schemes, sometime including strategic considerations will be
studied. I will restrict attention to some practical voting rules which, up to
unavoidable ties, select a winner: Plurality, Borda, Copeland and Approval
voting. I will not compute choice correspondences like the Uncovered set,
the Essential set or the Yolk which are set-valued in practice.
Section 2 introduces the cultures this chapter deals with: (1) Common
interest cultures, in the tradition of Rousseau and Condorcet; (2) Impartial
culture, often considered by mathematicians and social choice theorists; (3)
Distributive cultures, suitable for the study of the “Divide a dollar” problem;
(4) Spatial Euclidean cultures, often met in Theoretical Politics. Section 3
introduces the voting rules and voter behavior under scrutinity. Section 4
contains the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Cultures
2.1 Rousseauist cultures
In this section I model individual preferences that may diﬀer because of
mistakes individuals make when forming their opinion about a pre-existing
truth. This the typical approach of Condorcet: diﬀerences of opinions are
due to diﬀerential information or to mistakes with respect to some under-
lying truth that collective decision-making can discover. Such a conceptual
framework is called “project assessment’ by Nurmi and Salonen (2008). It is
the framework of the original “Condorcet Jury theorem” (Condorcet 1785)
whose philosophy follows from Rousseau’s ideal (Rousseau 1762) of a “gen-
eral will.” I therefore refer to Rousseau and call such cultures Rousseauist
cultures.
To model the notion of individual mistakes I suppose that there exists
an underlying true ranking of the alternatives, say
1 Â 2 Â ... Â K
and that each voter is correct with probability p(k, k0) when comparing k
and k0. I suppose that these mistakes are independent from one voter to
another. The alternative number one, the “true” best alternative will be
called the Rousseau alternative.
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I use the two-parameter formulation of Truchon and Drissi-Bakhkhat
(2004) and Truchon (2008) which states that for some α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0, for
all k < k0 :
p(k, k0) =
eα+β(k
0−k−1)
1 + eα+β(k0−k−1)
.
Note that for k < k0:
1/2 ≤ p(k, k0) < 1.
I suppose that each voter gives one consistent opinion on each pair: if in-
dividual i reports that she prefers k to k0, she does not reports that she
prefers k0 to k. But I do not require the individual to be consistent across
pairs: If i reports that she prefers k to k0 and k0 to k00, she may reports that
she prefers k00 to k (of course this implies that she has made at least one
mistake). This framework is called the Rousseauist culture of size (n,K)
and parameters (α,β).
The information reported by each individual is therefore a tournament
(complete and asymetric binary relation) over the set of alternatives The
most likely reported tournament is the true ranking of the alternatives.
For β = 0 the probability of a mistake does not depend on the ranks of
the alternatives, as in Young (1988). The above model with β ≥ 0 is more
flexible and it seems reasonable to postulate that the probability of an error
is larger when comparing two alternatives closer one to each other in the
true underlying ranking. When β or α is large, p(k, k0) tends to one, which
means that the voter’s expertise is very good.
With a number n of voters, the individual preferences over pairs of al-
ternatives define a vote matrix M of size K ×K, in which the entry mk,k0
is the number of voters who prefer k to k0, with mk,k0 + mk0,k = n. For
convenience one can define on the diagonal mk,k = n/2.
A Condorcet winner can be defined in this framework: it is an alternative
k such that mk,k0 ≥ n/2 for all k0. In the simulations I will always take n
odd, so that there is no need to distinguish strict from large inequalities in
this definition. As usual a Condorcet winner needs not to exist but, if it
exists, it is unique.
Any rule based on pairwise comparisons may be computed in this frame-
work. For instance the Borda rule may be applied, even if some individual
preferences are not transitive: as it is well known, the Borda score of an
alternative k is the sum:
bs(k) =
KX
k0=1
mk,k0
3
and a Borda winner is and alternative with highest Borda score.1
2.2 Impartial culture
The Impartial culture for n voters and K alternatives is obtained by chosing
each individual preference at random uniformly among the K! linear order-
ings of the alternatives, and independently of the preferences of the other
voters. One thus obtains the uniform probability distribution over the set
of profiles of linear orders. In this culture, there is a complete symmetry
among alternatives: learning something on the relative ranking by some in-
divudals of some alternatives gives no information on the other individuals
or alternatives.
This mathematically simple culture has been widely studied in the social
choice literature. For instance it is known that the probability in this culture
of the existence of a Condorcet winner is growing with the number of voters
and the number of alternatives. See Gehrlein and Fishburn (1979), Gehrlein
(1997).
2.3 Distributive cultures
Distributive cultures describe societies of complete antagonism. They are
generated as follows. One unit of a divisible good (a “cake”) has to be
shared among n individuals. Each individuals wants her share to be as large
as possible, and does not care about the other shares. The set of alternatives
is here infinite, it is the n-simplex:
∆n =
(
x ∈ Rn : 0 ≤ xi,
nX
i=1
xi = 1
)
.
Theoretical models of redistributive politics (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987,
Myerson 1993, Lizzeri 1999, Laslier 2002, Laslier and Picard 2002) use eco-
nomic environments which are identical or related to this set of alternatives.
There is no obvious “natural” probability distribution over this set, and I
will use several such distributions.
2.3.1 Consensual redistributive culture
Here, I use the projection on ∆n of the uniform distribution on the cube
[0, 1]n. This distribution is most easy to simulate: one chooses at random
1The reader will easily make the connection with the other, equivalent, definition of
the Borda ruel using sum of ranks.
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(independently and uniformly between 0 and 1) numbers yki for i = 1, ..., n
and k = 1, ...,K and then computes
xki =
ykiPn
j=1 y
k
j
.
Ties can be neglected so that this process defines a random profile of
linear orders on K alternatives for n voters by setting
xk Pi x
k0 ⇐⇒ xki > xk
0
i .
Note that even if this culture describes a situation of complete antag-
onism, it is not clear wether alternatives in this culture are typically very
unequal distribution or close to the equal split. A first observation is that,
when the number n of individuals is large, the probability distribution on∆n
tends to concentrate around the point of equal division (1/n, 1/n, ..., 1/n).
This can be seen in the simulations by computing the standard deviation
d(x) =
vuut 1
n
nX
i=1
(xi −
1
n
)2
which is also the Euclidean distance between the point x and the equal
division (1/n, 1/n, ..., 1/n). This random quantity tends, in expectation, to
0 when n is large. (See the Appendix.) Therefore this culture may be
seen as consensual, or even egalitarian, because it describes a society who
tends to imagine solutions to the pure redistribution problem which are close
(according to the Euclidean distance) to the perfectly egalitarian one.
But inequality is usually measured not by the standard deviation but by
specific indices such as the Gini index of inequality. Let ui be the share of
the i-th poorest individual and let vi be the total share of the i-th poorest
individuals:
u1 ≤ u2 ≤ ... ≤ un
vi =
X
j≤i
uj .
In the case where the shares are all identical, ui = 1/n and vi = i/n. The
increasing numbers vi, for i = 1, ..., n, define the concentration of the distrib-
ution and one can measure how concentrated (or “unequal”) the distribution
is by the Gini index
gini(x) =
2
n
nX
i=1
µ
i
n
− vi
¶
.
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Figure 1: Consensual distributive culture, 99 individuals: histogram for the
Gini index.
n 3 5 11 49 99 999
Standard deviation .16 .10 .05 .01 .006 .00006
Gini index .25 .28 .31 .33 .33 .33
Table 1: Consensual distributive culture: Standard deviation and Gini index
depending on the number of voters
This coeﬃcient2 is between 0 and 1.
If one measures inequality by the Gini index of inequality, one reaches a
diﬀerent conclusion: When n is large the expected value of the Gini index
tends to 1/3. This is a non-degenerated value and, arguably, a relatively
small one. For these reasons I chose to call this culture the consensual dis-
tributive culture. Picture 1 shows the distribution of the values taken by
this index in a society of 99 individuals.
Empirical averages for the standard deviation and the Gini index are
provided in Table 1
2.3.2 Inegalitarian distributive cultures
In order to introduce these cultures, consider first that the scale of shares
obtained by the individuals is fixed and linear: the poorest individual gets
2 I use here a slightly simplified version of the Gini index. For a discrete distribution,
the exact formula is 2
n
Pn
i=1
³
i−1/2
n
− vi+vi−12
´
.
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e 1 1.2 1.5 2 3 4 5 6
Gini 0 .1 .2 .33 .5 .6 .66 .7
Table 2: Gini coeﬃcient depending on the parameter e
some amount t, the second poorest gets 2t, the third gets 3t, and so on up
to the richest individual who gets nt. Then the total amount is
(1 + 2 + ...+ n)t =
n(n+ 1)
2
t
and, in order that the individual shares add to 1, one sets t = 2n(n+1) .
A possible alternative is the assignments of these shares to individuals.
There are thus n! diﬀerent possible alternatives. This defines a culture if
these fixed shares are randomly assigned to the individuals. One picks at
random K of these redistributions, independently and uniformly to define
the linear-inegalitarian distributive culture of size (n,K). Note that in this
culture, unlike the previous case the amount of inequality is the same in any
alternative.
Starting from this idea, one can generalize it and define more or less
egalitarian redistributive cultures by changing the linear scale (t, 2t, ..., nt)
to a non linear one; then one can measure inequality by the usual Gini index.
This is what I will do now.
To generate preference profiles, consider a one-parameter familly of con-
centration curves
x 7→ xe
for e ≥ 1. In a society of n individuals with such concentration, the i poorest
individuals together get
vi =
µ
i
n
¶e
which means that the poorest individual has u1 =
¡
1
n
¢e, the second poorest
has u2 =
¡
2
n
¢e − ¡ 1n¢e, and so on up to the richest individual who has
un = 1−
¡
n−1
n
¢e
.
The inequality of such a redistribution depends on e (it is approximately
independent of n). The Gini coeﬃcients are given in Table 2.
Typical real values for the Gini index of income distributions at the
national level are .25 in Sweden, .33 in France, .45 in the US, .59 in Brasil
and more than .7 in some African countries.
I define the (emin, emax)-inegalitarian distributive culture of size (n,K)
as follows. For each k independently (with 1 ≤ k ≤ K) a parameter ek is
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picked at random uniformly on the interval [emin, emax], then alternative k is
chosen according to the concentration parameter ek, by assigning randomly
the specified shares to the individuals.
As mentionned above, distributive cultures are interesting models of Pol-
itics: an alternative is a political platform that oﬀers some amount to the
diﬀerent voters. One problem with this approach is that it is not reasonable
to imagine that actual poltical platforms can target individual voters one
by one. But certainly they can target social groups. To this respect, remark
that the distributive culture introduced in this section well describes a sit-
uation where there are not n individuals but n groups of individuals, the
groups being of equal size. Each of the K candidates then choses to favor
more or less the various groups. For this reason I find pertinent, as a model
of large politics, to consider inegalitarian distributive cultures for relatively
small values of the parameter n.
2.4 Spatial cultures
These cultures stem from the spatial theory of voting. In the Euclidean space
Rd with d dimensions, each voter i has a bliss point ωi and a utility function
defined on Rd which is decreasing with the distance to ωi:
ui(x) = − kx− ωik
An alternative is a point in Rd and a culture is defined by the number
of dimensions d and the probability distributions for n bliss points and K
alternatives.
2.4.1 Uni-dimensional spatial culture
As it is well known, for d = 1, a preference profile generated by the above
single-peaked utility functions always has a Condorcet winner, which is the
availlable alternative closest to the median bliss point (see for instance
Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) for details). This culture is an easy way
to generate profiles with this property.
2.4.2 Multi-dimensional cultures
With more than one, it may be the case or not. From the theory (McKelvey
1986), one may expect that (as soon as there are more than three voters) if
the number of candidate is large, the probability that one of them is a Con-
dorcet winner becomes very small; but this clearly cannot be true in general
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and indeed depends on the probability distributions on bliss points and al-
ternatives. For simplicity I will use only uniform distributions over bounded
boxes (intervals, rectangles,...), with the same probability distributions for
bliss points and for alternatives3.
If the box is very thin, then the profiles become similar to one-dimensional
profiles. If the rectangle or the box is far from degenerated, the uniform
choice of bliss points and alternatives may lead to think that, if the num-
bers of voters and alternatives are large, the profile can be qualitatively
described by a model with a continum of voters and alternatives uniformly
distributed. This convergence question is a delicate theoretical issue. McK-
elvey and Tovey (2008) study the convergence problem in the case of the
Yolk but I am not aware of other clear mathematical result. The simulation
results presented below give some clues.
3 Voting rules and behavior
I will be essentially interested in Plurality rule, the Borda rule, the Copeland
rule and Approval Voting, when voters vote sincerely or strategically. Strate-
gic behavior is introduced in a heuristic way as “responsive voting” without
reference to equilibrium considerations.
3.1 Sincere voting
I consider three voting rules based on sincere behavior. The well-known
Plurality rule, the Borda rule and the Copeland rule, which is a familiar
Condorcet-consistent agregation rule. For Approval Voting, sincere voting
(in the usual definition) does not provide a well-specified behavior. Behavior
under this rule must be responsive and is thus described in the next section.
For a profile of strict preferences, the Plurality score of an alternative
k is simply the number of individuals whose best-prefered alternative is k.
Plurality rule defines as winners the alternatives with largest plurality score.
If preferences are not strict, the definition is naturally completed by saying
that if d distinct alternatives tie at the first rank in an individual preference
ordering, then this individual gives, in the Plurality count, 1/d point to each
of them. If the individual preferences are not transitive, the Plurality rule
has no straightforward extension and I shall not use it.
3 Multidimensionnal Gaussian distributions are another option, used by Merill (1984)
for simulations and by Laslier (2006) for the theory.
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Some pieces of notations will be useful. Recall that mk,k0 denotes the
number of voter who (sincerly) prefer alternative k to alternative k0. The
collum-sum of the matrix M =
¡
mk,k0
¢
provides the candidates’ Borda
scores.
bs(k) =
KX
k0=1
mk,k0 .
Replacing the matrix M by the matrix T =
¡
tk,k0
¢
, with
tk,k0 =
½
1
0
if mk,k0 > n/2
if not
one obtains the “tournament” matrix where tk,k0 = 1 means that a majority
of voters prefers k to k0. The Copeland score cs(k) of an alternative k is the
the number of other alternatives k beats. It is easily computed from the
tournament matrix.
cs(k) =
KX
k0=1
tk,k0
whose possible values ranges from 0 if k is a Condorcet loser to K − 1 if k
is a Condorcet winner. A Copeland winner is an alternative with maximal
Copeland score. If there exists a Condorcet winner, this alternative is the
unique Copeland winner.
3.2 Responsive voting
Here the voters respond to an annonced candidate score vector. The pro-
posed reaction functions are derived from the theory of strategic voting: the
voter holds some belief on the other voters’ actions and rationally responds
to this belief. The availlable information is essentially the same for all vot-
ers: it is a public signal about the popularity of the various candidate. In
reality, such a signal is derived from the results of previous elections, from
pre-electoral polls, or from any similar public information. Although diﬀer-
ent behaviors may appear as “rational” behavior within some fully specified
game-theoretic models, the choices made here have the advantage of being
comparable among diﬀerent voting rules and cultures. In particular the pub-
lic signal always takes the form of an announced ranking of the candidates.
I do not need to suppose that a voter knows the other voters’ preferences,
or holds beleifs about them. In order to know what to do, a voter only has
to figure out what the others do.
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The important point is that individual rational behavior cannot be de-
fined, exept in general terms, knowing only the preferences. The answer to
the question “Is it rational for me to cast this ballot” depends on what
I beleive the other voters decide. It follows that a simulation approach to
strategic voter behavior has to take the form of what is called here “respon-
sive voting.”
3.2.1 Plurality voting
Given announced scores for the various candidates, the voter votes for her
preferred candidate among the two candidate with highest scores. If ties
occur at the first places in the score vector, I introduce a small noise in the
score vector to randomly break the ties and let the voter decide among two
candidates only. Then, clearly, votes gather on two candidates only. If one of
these two candidates is a Condorcet winner then this candidate wins, but it
is possible that a Condorcet winner exists but votes nevertheless gather on
other candidates. More exactly any candidate k except a Condorcet loser
can be elected, provided that people beleive that votes gather on k and
some other candidate k0 which is losing in front of k according to majority
rule. On that point, see Cox (1997) and Myerson (2002) for the theory and
Blais et al. (2008) for experiments. The theory, if not predictive, delivers
a clear-cut message here, the path-dependence eﬀect is so important that
simulation work does not appear to be of interest. I will therefore not study
strategic response in the case of Plurality voting.4
3.2.2 Approval voting
I use the strategic best-response function introduced and justified in Laslier
(2009). Given approval scores for the various candidates (and if there are no
ties in the first places) the voter considers the top-ranked candidate k1, the
“leader.” She votes for or against the other candidates by comparing them to
k1. In order to decide whether she votes for or against the leader k1 himself,
she compares k1 to k2, the second-ranked candidate (the “challenger”). (See
the example below.).
This response function has a fixed point if and only if there exists a
Condorcet winner; in that sense, strategic approval voting is Condorcet-
4Lehtinen (2008) studies Plurality and Approval in some three-alternative societies,
with voters’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs based on perturbation of sincere voting vote shares.
He concludes that Approval voting has a high utilitarian eﬃciency and Plurality has a
low utilitarian eﬃciency, which is improved by strategic behavior. See also Lehtinen’s
contribution in this volume.
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consistent. If there is no Condorcet winner, the best response function
is still well-defined, but the beliefs have to be specified. In the simula-
tions I compute the first five iterations of this function, starting from a
Condorcet-consistent sincere rule (I report on the Copeland rule, but using
other Condorcet-consistent rules leads to the same conclusions). If there is
a Condorcet winner, this candidate will not be defeated, and if there is no
Condorcet winner, the procedure has no fixed points but looking at the first
iterations may give a sense of what alternatives are selected by a society of
strategic voters using approval voting.
3.2.3 Borda voting
I use the following response function, which is inspired from the previous
one and could probably receive the same strategic justification. Given Borda
scores bs(k) of the various candidates k, and if there are no ties, the voter
considers in turn k1, k2,...,kK the candidates ordered according to the score
vector s. First she compares the leader k1 to his main challenger k2. If she
prefers k1, she puts k1 at the first place in her ballot and k2 at the last place,
thereby giving as many points as possible to k1 and as few points as possible
to k2. If she prefers k2 to k1 she does just the contrary. Then she turns to
k3, the third-ranked candidate in bs. She only compares k3 to k1, because if
there is to be a tie between two candidates involving k3, it will most likely
be a tie between k3 and k1. If she prefers k3 to k1,.she gives as many points
as possible to k3, and if she prefers k1to k3, she gives k3 as few points as
possible. She will thus put k3 in her ballot in the position 2 or K − 1. Then
she continues filling her Borda ballot this way until all the candidates have
been compared with k1.
Up to my knowledge, this heuristics has not been published for the study
of strategic behavior under Borda rule. It amounts to suppose that the voter
considers that the most likely ties are ordered by the score vector: {k1, k2}
is by far the most likely, followed by {k1, k3}, {k1, k4}, etc.
3.2.4 Example
Suppose that there are five candidates A,B,C,D,E and that the announced
score vector ranks the candidates as follows:
s(C) > s(A) > s(B) > s(D) > s(E)
Consider an individual whose preference Pi is:
A Pi B Pi C Pi D Pi E
12
• Under Plurality rule this individual will compare the leading candi-
dates C to his challenger A, and therefore vote “A” because she prefers
A to C.
• Under Approval Voting, she will vote “{A,B}” : The leader is C, thus
A and B are approved because they are better than C, and D and E
are not approved because they are worse than C. And C himself is not
approved because he is worse than the main challenger (A).
• Under the Borda rule (with the scale 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) she will give 4 points
to A, 0 points to C, 3 points to B, 1 points to D, 2 points to E,
thereby submitting the Borda-style ballot “A Â B Â E Â D Â C”.
3.2.5 Discussion
The reactions function that I use are not the only possible ones but they have
the advantage of being derived from the same idea, which is proeminent in
the strategic voting literature: each voter considers that his vote is going to
make a diﬀerence in the case of a tie between two candidates and responds
individually to her subjective beliefs about the chances of the candidates by
considering the likelyhood of possible ties.
I suppose that all voters simultaneously respond to the same belief, de-
fined by a score vector. The interpretation is natural here in terms of pre-
election pools. This way of doing has the advantage that it makes possible
to study strategic behavior out of equilibrium.
4 Results
I present (when possible) results for the winning alternative with sincere and
responsive voting under Plurality, Borda, Copeland and Approval Voting.
For responsive voting behavior, the winner may depends on the annonced
ranking of candidates (the score vector) to which the voters react.
For Aproval Voting, I choose to look at the iterated reactions starting
from the Copeland ranking of alternatives. This is because Aproval Vot-
ing, to many respect is a Condorcet-like voting method and Copeland is a
Condorcet-consistent rule. For Borda, I naturally chose to iterate starting
from the sincere Borda ranking.
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µ
n = 5
K = 5
¶
β = 0 β = .3 β = .5 β = .7 β = 1
α = 0 .31 (.07) .40 (.20) .52 (.30) .60 (.36) .69 (.42)
α = .4 .41 (.22) .63 (.43) .74 (.52) .81 (.58) .86 (.62)
α = .7 .54 (.40) .78 (.61) .86 (.68) .90 (.72) .93 (.75)
α = 1 .70 (.60) .87 (.76) .92 (.81) .96 (.84) .98 (.86)
Table 3: Rousseauist culture: probability of a Condorcet (a Condorcet-
Rousseau) alternative for 5 voters and 5 alternativesµ
n = 11
K = 5
¶
β = 0 β = .3 β = .5 β = .7 β = 1
α = 0 .32 (.06) .48 (.29) .61 (.39) .69 (.44) .74 (.48)
α = .4 .47 (.33) .78 (.62) .88 (.69) .91 (.72) .93 (.74)
α = .7 .69 (.61) .92 (.81) .95 (.85) .97 (.86) .98 (.87)
α = 1 .87 (.83) .98 (.94) .99 (.95) .99 (.95) 1.0 (.95)
Table 4: Rousseauist culture: probability of a Condorcet (a Condorcet-
Rousseau) alternative for 5 voters and 11 alternatives
4.1 Results for Rousseauist cultures
In this culture, Plurality voting is not well-defined in that case and I thus
concentrate on the other rules. The first observation is that if the number of
voters is large, because they are supposed to be independent, all voting rules
detect the Rousseau winner with a high probability. I thus focus attention
on small size societies (or “juries”) and take I = 5 and I = 11.
Such a profile may have a Condorcet winner or not, but it is important
to keep in mind that even if there exists a Condorcet winner, this alternative
may diﬀerent from the true best alternative, the “Rousseau” one. Table 3
and 4 show, for the case of K = 5 alternatives and n = 5 or 11 voters, the
probability of the event “there exists a Condorcet winner” and, in brack-
ets, the probability of the event “the Rousseau alternative is a Condorcet
winner.” These probabilities have been estimated from 1,000 draws of the
above model. For instance, for α = .4 and β = .5 (the values I will use later)
and for n = K = 5, in 74-52 = 22 % of cases there is a Condorcet winner
but this candidate is nevertheless the “wrong” one.
In order to evaluate voting rules and behaviors in such cultures, it is
natural to observe the rank, according to the true ranking, of the chosen
alternative. For Copeland rule and for Borda rule, this is well defined. For
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α = .4, β = .5, K = 5 n = 5
Pr. of Condorcet : .745
Pr. of Rousseau-Condorcet : .518
Rule Average rank
Copeland 2.05
AV1 1.724
AV2 1.769
AV3 1.405
AV4 1.661
AV5 1.759
Borda 1.268
Borda 1 2.586
Borda 2 1.557
Borda 3 2.140
Borda 4 1.605
Borda 5 1.901
n = 11
.877
.693
Average rank
1.727
1.384
1.441
1.235
1.366
1.444
1.116
2.832
1.342
2.155
1.403
1.654
Table 5: Rousseauist culture: Average rank of the chosen alternative for 5
alternatives
responsive voting behavior, this depends on the score vector to which the
voters react.
For Aproval Voting, I choose to look at the iterated reactions starting
from the Copeland ranking of alternatives. This is because Aproval Vot-
ing, to many respect is a Condorcet-like voting method and Copeland is a
Condorcet-consistent rule. For Borda, I naturally chose to iterate starting
from sincere Borda ranking.
Some results are reported in Tables 5, and 6. These Tables report average
ranks so, in reading them, one is interested in having ranks as small as
possible.
Intuitively, in such culture, applying the Borda rule seems a better way
to discover the best alternative than applying Condorcet-consistent choice
rules, for the following reason.
If the randomly generated profile is very homogeneous and close to the
true ranking, then all voting rules should agree. The diﬀerence between vot-
ing rules thus comes from the cases where enough mistakes have been done
by the voters and, most importantly, from mistakes made when comparing
the Rousseau winner to other alternatives. Because the probability of mis-
take decreases with the rank diﬀerence between alternatives, this probability
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α = .4, β = .5, K = 15 n = 11
Pr. of Condorcet : .865
Pr. of Rousseau-Condorcet : .670
Rule Average rank
Copeland 2.35
AV1 1.41
AV2 1.47
AV3 1.24
AV4 1.40
AV5 1.46
Borda 1.10
Borda 1 14.41
Borda 2 4.90
Borda 3 1.54
Borda 4 5.35
Borda 5 2.32
Table 6: Rousseauist culture: Average rank of the chosen alternative for 15
alternatives
is the largest when comparing the Rousseau alternative to alternative num-
ber 2, the second-best one. It follows that the probability that the Rousseau
alternative is detected as a Condorcet winner may be relatively low: as an
extreme case (if α = 0) one may have that voters are wrong half of the
time when comparing adjacent alternatives even if they are very skilled at
comparing distant ones.
With the chosen parameters (α = .4, β = .5, n small) one obtains .518,
.693 and .670 in Tables 5, and 6. As a consequence, the performance of the
Copeland method is rather poor: the average rank of the Copeland winner
is 2.05, 1.727, and 2.35.
The Borda rule also gathers information from other pairwise comparisons
so that its performance is better than the performance of Copeland : The
Borda winner has an average rank of 1.268, 1.116 and 1.10 with the same
parameters.
From the simulations, we also learn that the Borda rule, in this favorable
framework, behaves poorly with respect to manipulation, in contrast with
Approval Voting.
The lines “Copeland, AV1, AV2, ..., AV5” depict successive strategic
responses to the Copeland ranking, under Approval Voting. One can see
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that responsive voting is here beneficial.
The lines “Borda, Borda1,...” depict the successive strategic responses
to the sincere Borda ranking. One can see that strategic behavior is here
detrimental. This phenomena is very spectacular in the line “Borda 1” of
Table 6 (the average rank is there 14.41 out of 15 candidates) and it can also
be observed with a smaller number of candidates. Here is the explanation.
Consider the case of four alternatives, with true ranking
1 > 2 > 3 > 4,
and suppose first that all the voters agree on that ranking. Then sincere
Borda obviously provides the true ranking. But then the strategic response
of any voter is to rank the second alternative last, and to rank second the
least dangerous alternative, that is the one with the lowest score, that is
alternative 4, the worst one. This provides the (very un-sincere !) ballot:
1 > 4 > 3 > 2.
Now suppose that a fraction ε of the voters by mistake think that 2 is
better than 1. These voters tend to strategically rank 1 at the very last
position, giving him as few points as possible in the Borda count, precisely
because 1 is ranked first and appears thus as the most dangerous challenger
for 2. Moreover those voters, just like the ones who made no mistake, will
also put at the second position alternative 4, casting the ballot
2 > 4 > 3 > 1.
The Borda score of alternative 1 (with the Borda scale 3, 2, 1, 0) is thus
(1−ε)·3+ε·0 = 3−3ε and the Borda score of alternative 4 is (1−ε)·2+ε·2 =
2. It follows that, for ε > 1/3, the alternative with highest Borda count is
now alternative 4, the worst one !
If there are only three alternatives, this phenomenon does not happen5,
but if there are more alternatives, it becomes more frequent, even for small
mistake probabilities. This situation occurs often in the simulation, which
explains why the first-order strategic Borda winner is very badly ranked in
these cultures.
One can see how strategic thinking with the Borda rule gives rise to
erratic behavior, as reflected in these simulations. Of course this curious
5Many studies (Favardin et al. 2002, Myerson 2002, Lehtinen 2007) concentrate on
three-alternative cases, and thus miss this eﬀect.
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(1,000 or 100 draws) n = 3 n = 5 n = 11 n = 99
K = 3 .947 .939 .920 .914
K = 5 .840 .826 .746 .755
K = 15 .591 .514 .445 .41
K = 50 .41 .24 .20
Table 7: Impartial culture: probability of a Condorcet winner
pattern is a consequence of the extreme assumption that all the voters re-
act strategically and simultaneously to the same information. For instance
the eﬀect will be mitigated if some fraction of the voters vote sincerly by
principle. Borda himself defended his method by saying that it is “intended
for honest men.” This is a lucid remark, but one should stress that, in the
culture studied here, all voters share the same goal. Thus it is not clear that
they should be labbelled as “dishonest” when trying individually to be as
eﬃcient as possible in reaching the common will, even if they end up in a
collective faillure to do so.
4.2 Results for impartial cultures
Table 7 provides the frequency of the existence of a Condorcet winner, for
some profil size. One can see that this probability decreases when the num-
ber of candidates grows. To compare voting schemes in the impartial culture,
Table 8 indicates (for 11 voters and for 3, 5 and 15 candidates) the proba-
bility for a given voting scheme, to elect the (sincere) Borda winner.6 For
very small values of K, there is in general a Condorcet winner and, most
often, this alternative is also the Plurality and the Borda winner and indeed
the winner under most voting rules. So figures for K = 3 are all very large.
But when the number of individuals grows, things are quite diﬀrent. One
can notice in particular that strategic voting makes the Borda prediction
totally unstable: for K = 15. Acoording to the Table, the probability that
the strategic response to sincere Borda voting still elects the Borda winner
is only .163.7
6Ties are broken randomly so that the Borda winner is always unique.
7Note that this has little to do with the probability that the Borda rule be manipulated,
as ususally defined. Here all the voters vote responsively. Of course, if the number of
individuals is not small, the probability that a single vote makes a diﬀerence is tiny.
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(n = 11) K = 3 K = 5 K = 15
Pr. Condorcet : .920 .746 .445
Rule (Borda)
Plurality .800 .586 .248
Copeland .889 .780 .696
AV1 .857 .703 .426
AV2 .857 .682 .435
AV3 .889 .770 .569
AV4 .857 .721 .491
AV5 .857 .686 .447
Borda 1 1 1
Borda 1 .863 .514 .163
Borda 2 .846 .690 .545
Borda 3 .879 .547 .388
Borda 4 .860 .698 .464
Borda 5 .852 .690 .489
Table 8: Impartial culture with 11 voters: Probability of chosing the Borda
winner
(1,000 or 100 draws) n = 3 n = 5 n = 11 n = 99
K = 3 .751 .790 .752 .761
K = 5 .379 .348 .351 .39
K = 15 .004 .005 .002 .00
Table 9: Consensual distributive culture: probability of a Condorcet winner
4.3 Results for consensual distributive cultures
Table 9 provides the frequency of the existence of a Condorcet winner, for
various profil sizes. One can see that this probability tends quickly to 0
when the number of candidates grows.
A specific feature of this culture is that the Gini index of inequality
tends to 1/3 when the number n of voters tends to infinity. For instance,
for n = 11, the expected value of this index is .31. This is what would
be obtained on average if there was no vote but a random choice. Table
10 provides the average values of the Gini index for the winning alternative
according to diﬀerent voting schemes. Note that the three value K = 3, 5, 15
chosen for the number of candidates give rise to preference profiles which are
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quite diﬀerent one from the other since the frequency of Condorcet winners
goes from 75% to 2%. In terms of inequality, one notices that Plurality
voting does slightly worse than a random choice whereas the other schemes
do slightly better.
The interpretation of these results must be related to the shape of the
probability distribution over the set of alternatives that this culture defines.
The main question that is raised when comparing voting rules in redistribu-
tive settings is to know to what extend a voting schemes tends to select more
or less egalitarian alternatives. But in the consensual distributive culture,
the probability distribution over the set of alternatives is such that existing
alternatives tend to be similar to that respect. It is therefore delicate to dis-
entangle by simulation this eﬀect from the eﬀect of the diﬀerent voting rules.
Since there is no reason to believe that the consensual distributive culture is
close to any “real” culture (despite its mathematical simplicity), I conclude
that one should rather use a diﬀerent approach in order to study by simu-
lation the redistribution problem. This is why I introduced the other kind
of distributive cultures, called “inegalitarian distributive cultures,” which I
will study now.
4.4 Results for inegalitarian distributive cultures
For the simulations I chose the parameters
emin = 1.3
emax = 4.
With this values, the interval of possible values for the Gini index of inequal-
ities roughly covers the actual national values of this coeﬃcient for income
distributions. But the Gini formula is not linear with the parameter e. With
the uniform distribution for the parameter e on the interval [emin, emax], one
obtains a probability distribution for the Gini index as depicted in Figure 2.
Table 11 provides the probability of the existence of a Condorcet winner,
for various profile sizes. One can see that this probability varies a lot with
the number of candidates and, perhaps more surprisingly, the number of
individuals.
Voting rules and behaviors are compared with respect to the degree of
inequality proposed by the winning candidate, measured by the Gini index.
Table 12 shows such results for the case of n = 11 individuals (or 11 groups
of individuals of equal size). One can see that Plurality rule behaves very
poorly, indeed worse than the mere random choice of an alternative.
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(n = 11) K = 3 K = 5 K = 15
Pr. Condorcet : .752 .351 .002
Rule Gini
random choice .31 .31 .31
Plurality .32 .36 .40
Copeland .30 .30 .29
AV1 .31 .30 .31
AV2 .31 .31 .31
AV3 .30 .30 .31
AV4 .31 .31 .30
AV5 .31 .31 .30
Borda .31 .30 .29
Borda 1 .31 .31 .31
Borda 2 .31 .31 .31
Borda 3 ..31 .31 .31
Borda 4 .31 .30 .30
Borda 5 .31 .31 .31
Table 10: Consensual redistributive culture with 11 voters: Average inequal-
ity of the chosen alternative
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
100
200
300
400
Figure 2: Inegalitarian distributive culture: histogram for the Gini index
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(1,000 or 100 draws) n = 3 n = 5 n = 11 n = 99
K = 3 .803 .800 .825 .941
K = 5 .419 .403 .500 .81
K = 15 .013 .013 .029 .21
K = 50 .00 .00
Table 11: Inegalitarian distributive culture: probability of a Condorcet win-
ner
This is an interesting observation, and an argument against Plurality
voting with three or more candidates. The phenomenon is even spectacular
when the number of voters and candidates is large. For instance with n = 99
voters and K = 15 candidates, the plurality winners has an average Gini
index of .57, whereas a random choice yields .42. The intuition is that
in order to be the preferred alternative of several voters, a candidate must
propose to each of them more than what is proposed by the other candidates.
In order to do so, the candidate should propose very little to the voters
which are not targeted, hereby proposing a relatively unequal distribution.
Following this mechanism, in this setting, Plurality rule promotes inequality.
Other voting rules, such as Copeland and Borda do not suﬀer this pathol-
ogy and designate alternatives with smaller Gini index. Voter strategic be-
havior in that case is detrimental to equality, although not as detrimental
as sincere Plurality.
4.5 Results for spatial cultures
4.5.1 Results for unidimensional culture
Results for the unidimensional case are reported in Table 13 for n = 11
voters. This Table indicates for the various rules how frequent is the elec-
tion of the Condorcet winner. Since a Condorcet winner always exists in
this culture, the Copeland rule and the Approval Voting responses to the
Copeland ranking always elect the Condorcet winner.
Plurality does not often elects the Condorcet winner. Note that, since
positions are chosen at random and uniformly, up to some border eﬀects, all
candidates are equally likely to be chosen by Plurality rule.
The Borda rule does much better under sincere voting than Plurality.
The iterated strategic responses to the Borda ranking do very bad in the
first iteration, as was already seen in previous sections but the situation here
improves with successive iterations.
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(n = 11) K = 3 K = 5 K = 15
Pr. Condorcet : .825 .500 .029
Rule Gini
random choice .42 .42 .42
Plurality .42 .47 .54
Copeland .36 .32 .26
AV1 .36 .35 .35
AV2 .36 .35 .37
AV3 .36 .34 .36
AV4 .36 .34 .36
AV5 .36 .35 .35
Borda .36 .32 .26
Borda 1 .36 .39 .40
Borda 2 .36 .35 .36
Borda 3 .36 .37 .36
Borda 4 .36 .35 .36
Borda 5 .36 .36 .35
Table 12: Inegalitarian redistributive culture with 11 voters: Average in-
equality of the chosen alternative
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(n = 11) K = 3 K = 5 K = 15
Pr. Condorcet : 1 1 1
Rule (Condorcet)
Plurality .736 .528 .305
Copeland 1 1 1
AV1 1 1 1
AV2 1 1 1
AV3 1 1 1
AV4 1 1 1
AV5 1 1 1
Borda .868 .777 .616
Borda 1 .850 .508 .158
Borda 2 .996 .557 .166
Borda 3 .983 .732 .223
Borda 4 .999 .739 .271
Borda 5 .998 .806 .340
Table 13: Uni-dimensional culture with 11 voters: Probability of chosing
the Condocet winner
In spatial cultures, it makes sense to consider large numbers of voters.
Further exploration in this direction, which are not reported here, confirm
the above findings.
4.5.2 Results for multi-dimensional culture
Results for a two-dimensional case are reported in Table 14 for n = 11 voters.
Bliss points and alternatives are drawn from a rectangle of size 1 × .5. In
this cultures, it is possible that no Condorcet winner exist, but this is a rare
phenomenon if the number of alternatives is not large. I therefore take as
a reference point a Condorcet-consistent voting scheme: the Copeland rule.
This Table indicates for the various rules how frequent is the election of the
Copeland winner. Since a Condorcet winner often exists in this culture, the
Copeland rule and the Approval Voting responses to the Copeland ranking
usually coincide (and elect the Condorcet winner).
Plurality behaves diﬀerently Note that, since I choose positions at ran-
dom and uniformly, up to some border eﬀects, all candidates are equally
likely to be chosen by Plurality rule.
The Borda rule does much better under sincere voting than Plurality.
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(n = 11) K = 3 K = 5 K = 15
Pr. Condorcet : .989 .966 .833
Rule (Copeland)
Plurality .782 .538 .233
Copeland 1 1 1
AV1 .989 .966 .833
AV2 .989 .966 .833
AV3 .989 .998 .935
AV4 .989 .967 .860
AV5 .989 .966 .841
Borda .874 .538 .624
Borda 1 .861 ..479 .122
Borda 2 .988 .500 .133
Borda 3 .966 .661 .316
Borda 4 .990 .674 .393
Borda 5 .965 .753 .476
Table 14: Bi-dimensional rectangular culture with 11 voters: Probability of
chosing the Condocet winner
The iterated strategic responses to the Borda ranking do very bad in the
first iteration, as was already seen in previous sections when the number of
candidates is not very small but the situation here improves with successive
iterations.
In spatial cultures, it makes sense to consider large numbers of vot-
ers. Further exploration in this direction confirm the above findings One
point should neverthless be stressed. With uniform probability distributions
on boxes, drawing a large number of points tends to produce ever more
symmetric patterns. Empirical distributions tend to ressemble the uniform
continous distribution, which is a very specific situation (mistakenly consid-
ered as “general” by Tullock (1967)). For instance, here are some results
obtained in the four-dimensionnal culture on the box 1 × 1 × 1 × 1. With
K = 3 alternatives and n = 5 voters a Condorcet winner exists most often
(observed frequency: 97%). Increasing the number of alternatives makes this
freaquency decrease, in conformity with the “chaos” ideas of Spatial Vot-
ing theory. With K = 50 alternatives, the observed frequency is 46%. But
picking uniformly many voters makes this frequency increase. With K = 50
alternatives and n = 99 voters, the observed frequency is 91%.
25
5 Conclusion
This study confirms what has been observed theoretically and empirically:
(1) Voting rules exist that improve substancially on Plurality rule. (2) Apart
the voting rule itself, the behavior of voters is of primary importance to
predict the outcome of an election and therefore to assess the quality of a
voting rule.
One point that is emphasised by these simulations is that the way we
should judge voting rules depends also on the context. What is the number
of voters and options ? What are these options ? Are we dealing with a
problem of shared interest or a conflict ? All these questions are relevant.
With respect to strategic voting it appears that the use of the Borda rule
may generate substancial perverse eﬀects, in particular if there are many
alternatives on the agenda. Comparatively, Approval voting does not seem
to generate such pathologies. This may be related to the fact that strategic
behavior under Approval Voting is usually sincere (in fact in the model
which was used, such is always the case) according to the usual definition of
sincerity for Approval Voting (“If you approve A and not B then you prefer
A to B”). On the contrary, strategic behavior under the Borda rule may
produce very un-sincere votes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Standard deviation in the consensual distributive cul-
ture
The variables yi, i = 1, ..., n are independent and uniform on [0, 1]. Let
s =
Pn
i=1 yi and xi = yi/s. The standard deviation d(x) of x is such that
d(x)2 =
1
n
X
i
µ
yi
s
− 1
n
¶2
=
1
s2
1
n
X
i
³
yi −
s
n
´2
When n tends to infinity, the sum 1n
P
i
¡
yi − sn
¢2 tends to the theoretical
variance of the uniform distribution on [0, 1], that is a fixed positive number.
Because, s/n tends to the expected value 1/2, one can see that d(x) tends
to 0 as n−1.
A.2 Gini index in the consensual distributive culture
The index is:
gini =
2
n
nX
i=1
µ
i
n
− vi
¶
where vi denotes the (partial ordered) sum of the i smallest values of the n
variables described above. One can write
gini =
2
n
nX
i=1
⎛
⎝ i
n
−
iX
j=1
ui
s
⎞
⎠ .
For n large, s is close to n/2 so that gini is close to
2
n2
nX
i=1
i− 4
n2
nX
i=1
iX
j=1
ui
The first term tends to 1. For the second term, note that
Pi
j=1 ui ' i2/(2n)
and
Pn
i=1 i
2 ' i3/3. Thus the second term tends to 2/3 and one can see why
gini tends to 1/3.
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